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Heros are Our Future

The first people to make use of wildland fire in the North American Continent were the Native American Indians. We are sure that they lit wildland fires, but did they manage them or suppress them? It is probable that they managed their fires and occasionally saw the need to take suppression action. They must have had designated fire setters and fire managers, otherwise if anyone could set fires it would soon become a problem for the tribe. Whatever they did with wildland fire was done without personal protective equipment (PPE) or the use of equipment or technology, except for the use of the flying, flaming arrow. There is little known about their successes or failures.

Next to use wildland fire were the settlers. How much the settlers knew about wildland fire management or suppression when they began, is not clear. The settlers and military probably didn't learn much from the Indians due to the fact that they were not usually the best of friends, the settlers being trespassers, on the lands of the Indian. Because the relationship of the settlers and Indians was not a good learning relationship, the knowledge the Indians possessed was not transferred to the settlers. We read in various publications that the Indians used fire but not how they actually planned to set, manage or put out the wildland fires. We have no records of their successes, failures or fatalities in the use of wildland fires. This time in history was a time when information learned by experience was not easily transferred to others.

The first one hundred years or so after this country was being settled by the Europeans, wildland fires were fought by volunteers, each learning most of their skill by the trial and error method. It wasn't until after 1905, when the National Forests came into being, that wildland fire suppression grew into a more sophisticated approach. Firefighting became a profession and the usual ad hoc fire brigade that dealt with the emergency situation started to be replaced with fire departments. Fire experience accumulates slowly. Just was as it is today, lack of experience does not stop the adventurous from going hell bent for leather to wildfires with the intent to fight them.

There are some historical markers, created by tragic circumstances, and one of the first were the 1910 wildfires in Idaho, that swept over Ed Pulaski and his firefighting crew. The story goes, that Pulaski finding himself and his crew of forty five cut off by a raging wildfire. He found the only chance his crew had was to take shelter in a mine shaft. One man died beneath a falling tree as he ran his own way, five of the men died in the mine shaft and the remaining thirty-eight men, including Ranger Pulaski, lived through the ordeal. Edward Pulaski was a Ranger in the US Forest Service and became a hero of early Western forest fire fighting. The story spread and is fresh and alive today, a story of an adventure that created a hero.

This captivating story may have become the model for the creation of the heroes of the future. This story and other similar fire stories defined the path to follow in order to become a hero firefighter. All one had to do to become a hero was to get into a fire situation that could become a death trap for the leader and the firefighters and in some courageous way, live through the event to tell the story.

The downside to creating a hero is, that there is often some number of combatants who are killed or sustain burn injuries to their bodies which maim them forever, and do untold damage to their emotional health which may likewise never heal. This is the price paid by the heroes of wildfire. For most people it would not be worth it. How did things get that way?

If we examine the fatality fires that are part of the history of the modern fire management era, we will find that these situations cultivate a great story and the story often produces a fire hero. The qualifications for herodom are much the same as those applied in 1910 which made Ed Pulaski into a hero ranger.

Many red blooded young men and women aspire to become the hero among their peers. Facing dangerous fire situations seems a way to gain respect and admiration from those you supervise and your peers. The urge is strongest in the young and less experienced. A youngster who is caught up in the thrills that wildfire situations can produce, will push a reasonable tactic into a risky tactic, pushing the envelope further and further, again and again, until the numbers catch up with them and they become the hero, or dead, or maimed, or emotionally burned.

There were seventy-five firefighters killed in the Northern Rockies in 1910, twenty-five in the Griffith Park Fire of 1933, thirteen on the Mann Gulch fire in 1949, fifteen in the Rattlesnake fire of 1953, twelve in the Loop Fire of 1966, fourteen at South Canyon in 1994. These "marker" fires have produced their heroes. There is no fanfare for them but they are allowed to be the heroes. They are the ones writers write about and movies are made of.

Leadership
The government has the largest wildland fire suppression responsibility in the nation. They have large and well oiled organizations to support wildland fire suppression tasks consisting of paid crews and full time fire supervisors, and their own research and development section. By now, ninety years into organized fire fighting, we should have most of the wildland fire problems about solved. But this is not the case. One persistent problem is the loss of firefighter lives in situations where tactics become dangerous because the fire suddenly changes.

The fatality fires are producing heroes created partly by the news media and partly by the acceptance of the idea that the dead must be protected by the ones who remain. These fallen and injured firefighters were brave souls doing a high risk job who got caught by fire. We portray, that in this particular circumstance, the wildfire was so mystical that no one could have predicted what it was about to do. Fighting a fire is a risky business. We explain the reasons, "The firefighters were caught by an unexpected wind shift." or "The fire blew up and trapped the firefighters."

Cause and Effects
What is that kind of accident report rhetoric doing to the young romantic firefighter's ideals? We can't tell them that fire heroes are not important to others. We can't reverse the perception that dead firefighters are not heroes. It is a dilemma and a shield at the same time, worded so that it shields the administration from the criticism of sending firefighters into battle who are not fully competent to cope with the situation. Perceptions of unpredictable fire behavior and brave firefighters, shield the victims from the reality that individuals know to be true.

Fatality fires require investigation. The rhetoric in the investigation reports walks the fence between supporting the hero and pointing out the fool. The accident report is a much harder story to tell and to sell. These investigative reports list what the investigators think are the causes for the accident and who is responsible for causing the accident. Many times the report is used to point out funding deficiencies or used to further a favored cause such as a reference to the inadequacies in the amount of prescribed burning. It is like the writers are saying, "Let us not allow the dead firefighters to have given their lives in vain. Let's make congress feel guilty and get some additional funding." That is no better a cause than dying to protect a forest. There is just no way that firefighting fatalities can be justified like the fatalities in wartime. Freedom has always been worth dying for but firefighters are not dying for freedom. Firefighters who die have just made a mistake.

The accident report for the Elizabeth Incident on the Angeles National Forest in July of 1981, is an example of the use of the idea of counting the number of procedural errors that were made by the trapped firefighters. The idea is, that if no rules had been broken, the firefighters would not have been burned over. The assumption is that the firefighters can fight fire and obey all the procedures and rules. There is no wiggle room given for the way the firefighters actually viewed the situation or how fast things changed for them. There is no allowance made for the possibility that they were in a situation they were not adequately prepared for. Their training failed to bail them out. Their experience and training were not sufficient to enable them to predict the fire's potential. If they were qualified then they should have known it was too dangerous to remain there. The facts speak for themselves. They got caught and were, at the moment, not in compliance with all the procedures or rules of engagement.

The normal day to day firefighting rule enforcement is weak or non existent on the fire lines. This evaluation style has become recognized as the industry standard and has been used by OSHA in their investigations.

Many firefighters feel their situation is often misunderstood. They have doubts about the level of knowledge of the report writers. Many do not accept the view that these orders, rules and procedures can be complied with at all times and during all situations. They doubt that it is realistic to expect firefighters to never take a chance or bend rules. They may feel that obeying rules and procedures will not save them from the result of a bad decision or tactic. Few will argue with such a formal document as the accident report. The rank and file shrug the unacceptable words and accusations off like they do the wind born ashes and embers that fall on their shoulders. They can take solace in the thought that after all, heroes are not made of those who follow all the procedures to the letter, are they? The rift between the groundpounder and the fire officer widens. The firefighters may feel they are caught between the flames and the administration's need to "cover their exposure."

Procedurized firefighting has become the industry standard. Future investigators will compare acts and omissions with more than 50 rules of engagement including the 10 Standard Orders, the 18 Watchouts, L.C.E.S., the use of PPE, listing the number of compromises they find. The reports tally up the number that justifies their accusations of the use of poor judgment. After the flame gets through with you the investigators will "pile on" the list of procedural errors, leaving little or no chance for appeal. This can be the end of a firefighter's career. The only thing left, after the smoke clears and the ink dries, is the hero status. If the fire doesn't get you, your own outfit will.

There remains some unanswered questions in the investigative reports. Could the victims have known what was about to occur? Could they have seen the situation becoming dangerous? Why couldn't the one who understood the danger of the situation stopped the others from foolhardy actions? Who knew what was about to happen? How did they know? In most fatality situations someone saw the danger in time and couldn't extract others even though they talked about it. There is no common language to do so.

The Mann Gulch fire of 1949 had a book written of the accident and a major motion picture made of the story. The South Canyon fire of 1994 had a book size report published in about forty-two days from the date of the accident. In Michael Thoele's book titled "Fire Line", heroes are made of the firefighters following the path Ranger Pulaski left in the ashes of 1910. Depicting victims of burnovers as heroes makes interesting storytelling but we wouldn't want our firefighters to take it as an example of how fires should be fought. We don't want them to repeat those experiences. Envision a hero that will inspire the firefighters to follow a safer path than our heroes of yesteryear. We need to create a fine example. How would we describe and create the new hero who could inspire without endangering firefighters? Where can we find the new age heroes?

Most of the wildland fires are suppressed and mopped up without loss of life even though any number of them were as dangerous as the fatality fires. None of these I know of were treated with anywhere near the time and attention of the fatality fires. The fires that are handled without accidents and fatalities are reported in briefest form. The fire team that successfully completes it's task makes it's report, files it and disbands without fanfare. These successful campaigns do not produce heroes. The situations did not meet the "Pulaski" criteria. We have always dedicated most of the attention on the failures.

Can the new heroes be made from superior acts of firefighters who are successful? Wouldn't that be great? We could inspire the young firefighters to become successful! We should recognize the best firefighters, rewarding them for good judgment. We could create an interest in becoming one of the new age heroes.

The elite firefighter
If we were to create a new age hero for the firefighters to aspire to become, what would, what could it be? A firefighter who is better at fighting fire than most others, might be a good start. What defines a better firefighter? One that wins and does not lose? One who avoids the traps of wildfire by being able to predict the fire's behavior? One who keeps firefighters from harm? One who can describe winning strategy and tactics. One who can lead firefighters to successes. Where are these firefighters? They already exist.

Names that come to my mind of the elite firefighters are: Stub Mansfield, Gordon Garrett, Dick Raybould, Doc Davis, Don Beidabach, Charlie Caldwell, Mark Linane, Lanky Lechleiter, Terry Raley, Bob Rigetti and J.W. Allendorf. This is not a list of all the "elite" but those whom I know and have seen perform with high knowledge and skill on many wildfires. These were the people who know wildland fire. These people have developed the skill and knowledge to avoid the many fire behavior traps ever-present on wildfires.

When I asked them how they came to know what to do in fire situations, they said they just knew.

Fatalities are the result of errors
There is an elite core of firefighters who make a point of doing error free firefighting. These firefighters are just as tough, work just as hard, get just as fatigued as the others. In addition, they know wild fire well. They know what their forces can do and what the fire can do. Fire behavior fatalities will continue to occur until this knowledge base is tapped and organized into a training, qualification and performance mandate.

How long can we wait?
How long do we wait until we determine that we need to do something different rather than do things better in order to change the future incidents of fatalities? We need to identify those who already know how to foresee the fire's behavior and select tactics that are safe and effective. Who are these experienced people? Who are those supervisors who do the job the way we envision it should be done?

If the movie industry decided to make a new star it would accomplish it. They create the new image through mass media campaigns and they get it done. All that is required is the will to do so.

Changing the way we think.
Successful suppression of wildland fires should become our most important events.

The way to change the fatality count is to pay closer attention to how successful conclusions were achieved. The requirements of investigation of fatality incidents on wildland fires should not be considered useful information with which to bail ourselves out of the cyclic fatality fire problem. We continue to have the same type of situations and fatalities we did in the past. There will always be some whom we have qualified and are in supervisor positions who do not have the knowledge or skill nor are they swayed by accident reports and counts of violations of orders and watchouts. These are the crews who continue to be run out, time and time again.

Eliminating the dangerous supervisor and rewarding the one who is successful, will do more to change the threat of continued fire behavior fatalities in the future than continuing on the present course, trying again and again to do the old stuff better. Change "hazard pay" to "success pay." A comparison

In the Forest Service there is a procedure evoked when there has been a vehicle accident. The driver's license is taken and driving privileges are suspended. The rules are reviewed and if violations are found, fault is established. Some unsafe act is usually responsible for the accident. There is often disciplinary action taken. Driving privileges are suspended, re-training and re-testing is required.

Why is this procedure not utilized on fire accidents? For instance when a crew deploys shelters because they were performing an unsafe tactic, the license to operate isn't suspended. The supervisor is not re-trained or re-tested and although there might be some criticism, is allowed to continue to re-engage the fire.

The leader of the El Cariso Hot Shots went down the line and Chuck Hartley, the leader of another IHSC thought it unsafe. How much attention did Chuck get? None! Did the other, burned over supervisor, get his red card pulled? No! Was he re-trained or re-tested? Was he allowed to continue to function without restriction? Who became the hero of the Loop incident? Who do we remember when we hear accounts of the Loop Fire? Paul Gleason had to remind us of Chuck and his outstanding and courageous decision.

Just saying no doesn't help the others.
Hartley just said no. Saying no saved the lives of his 20 crewmen. He said no to the other Superintendent. He knew that it was unsafe. Chuck's intuition wasn't enough to deter the others. This incident shows an instance where just say no did not help others. Ignoring another qualified fire supervisor's judgment led his crew into a death trap. Just saying no won't stop all the others with poor judgment of the situation.

What are the qualification standards we should use?
What would the fatality statistics of the future be if we were to insist that only accident free supervisors be allowed to remain qualified to supervise? What would result from having those who are the "new age elite" firefighters become special and make them our instructors? What would result from taking bad fire judgment seriously enough to pull red cards and restrict those who have had a fire accident that endangered others? How many chances do we give a firefighter who uses bad judgment and endangers his fellow firefighters? One, two, three flare-ups and your out? What would change if we named the elite and defined the elite group as people who do it 100% right? What could be changed by rewarding success? Why not pay out for lives saved rather than paying exclusively for damages from accidents?

The Mission and Vision of the Leadership.
The vision and mission for leadership and firefighters alike needs to change in order to change the future.

By Doug Campbell
USFS Retired