The
Fire Behavior Language
Following
is a glossary of CPS terms:
A
simple way to view the fire ground and to explain how the fire will
change in intensity.
A segment
of a wildland fire will gain intensity and speed where it finds
a time or place of more favorable alignment. To communicate this
change say; "The fire is going into better alignment with ---" (naming
the force of change.)
There
are three primary causative forces present which influence the variations
in intensity and rate of spread of a wildland fire. As the fire
burns over the topography, the forces change independently. Each
force can aid or retard the spread. The forces can work together
or cancel each others effects out. The three forces usually associated
with fire behavior are Weather, Topography and Fuel, AKA the fire
triangle.
There
are many ways to interpret information about weather, topography
and fuel and this can make a fire behavior prediction complex. How
can it be made simple? The CPS isolates causative elements that
change fire intensities. This reduces the data that needs to be
considered to make predictions of change. The primary forces that
cause wildland fires to change are wind, slope, and fuel temperature
variations. Observations of how these forces vary in the path of
the fire are the first step in predicting changes in the fire behavior
potential. A very good rule to start with is to fight fire where
it is out of alignment.
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A device
that uses candles to demonstrate the phenomenon of how extreme fire
behavior can occur. This candle board demonstrates the variability
of fire intensity while all factors are the same except the arrangement
of fire on the board. A line of fire has one signature flame length
while a zone of fire has another. The difference is caused by the
preheating differences each arrangement produces. The flame length
of the line of fire can be induced to factors of ten. Watch out
for sprinklers in the room when demonstrating this effect.
The
idea is to understand that how fire is arranged makes a vast difference
in the production of flame. The next step is to be able to foresee
it happening on the fireground and to move out of the way.
Following
that, it paves the way to understanding how to manage intensities
and the amount of fuel consumption on prescribed burning operations
to the maximum degree.
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Variations
of wind, slope, solar heating of fuels ( fuel temperature) are fire
behavior information. The variations in these forces are the direct
cause of fire behavior change. These variations are observable.
Fire
behavior information excludes generalizations made to express conditions
in the area of the fire such as air temperature, relative humidity,
fuel moisture content, live fuel moisture content, and wind speed
at 20 feet.
In
order to make predictions of fire intensity change and to determine
when and where they might occur certain select information is relevant.
Identifying the kind of information needed for that task is important
to enable proper focus. Fire behavior information reduces the amount
of data commonly associated with fire behavior prediction. It simplifies
prediction by using the fewest number of inputs that are actually
causing fire speed and intensity variations on a particular segment
of the fire.
The
intensities and rates of spread observed on a free burning fire
adequately describe the affects the fire danger is having on the
fire. To be able to predict a place or time of fire intensity change,
the observer must identify what is different ahead of the fire.
When
conditions are such that only part of the fire behavior variable
can be dealt with successfully, the fire officer needs to determine
the fire's weak spots and attack the fire at those points. The tactician
can accomplish this using only the fire behavior information.
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A statement
that directs resources on a segment of a fire. Used each time incoming
resources report they are "on scene".
Assignments
to engage a wildland fire and accomplish a control objective should
be thoughtfully planned. If all you hear is the order to engage
the fire the plan may not thought out. If the officer cannot explain
how the tactic selection was decided then the officer may not know
the risks. It should be imperative to implement a tactic that is
viable under the fire behavior condition. In order for the engaging
fire officer to know the plan is well thought out the commanding
officer must communicate the logic before the order to engage the
fire.
The
tactic needs to have a basis of logic and contain the cause of fire
intensity change or contain the basis for the logic that the fire
will not change for the duration of the engagement. The CPS language
gives the supervisor the ability to communicate the logic behind
the tactic that is selected.
After
a size-up is made instructions must be given to firefighters who
arrive on scene. The CPS teaches how to communicate the whole situation
that exists, the potential for change and the tactic selected. The
following is an example of a complete fire behavior tactics statement.
This is not a report on conditions and a request for additional
resources.
A complete
statement includes:
A
description of the fire scene which includes the type of fire,
the segment of the fire on the topography and how it is aligned
with the forces of slope, wind and preheat as well as when and
where it may change.
An
example:
"This
fire is a topography fire. The fire is running up slope in hot
fuel, aligned with the wind and is generating 40 foot flame lengths
which is beyond our threshold of control. The fire is going over
the ridge and will be out of alignment with wind, slope and in
cool fuel within the hour and it will then be within our capabilities.
Use your resources to attack the fire directly where and when
it goes out of alignment."
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Information
that is useful in planning but not so useful in fire behavior predictions.
Fire
danger information is useful in anticipating resource needs because
it is an indicator of the difficulty of control of a wildland fire.
The values of the air mass and the fuel moisture content are fire
danger information. The values are combined in a formula and when
calculated, result in a point on a scale of fire danger from low
to extreme. The fire intensity variances become greater as fire
danger increases. The fluctuations in the air temperature, relative
humidity, fine fuel and 10 hour fuel stick moisture content are
generalized to represent the conditions in the area of the fire.
Micro climate variations in these values are not usually measured
and are not easily observed.
The
CPS does not use this data to make predictions of fire intensity
change. Fire danger numbers nor the ingredients which are air temperature
and humidity to name my favorites, do not explain the variations
going on at a single point in time on a fire perimeter because they
are one value and are not meant to describe the degree of variation
occurring under any fire danger condition.
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Logic
to explain the basis of opinions.
Fire
Ground Logic includes valuable input in solving tactical problems
while intuition rejects disagreement. The primary issue is to realize
that it is changes in the fire's rate of spread or intensity that
makes a fire dangerous.
There
are two ways used to deal with the fire changing.
- One
is to post a lookout and react to the change. This is the primeval,
tried and failed method, thought to provide sufficient margins
of safety by many at all levels in the fire service. Much is made
of posting a lookout and little of what the lookout is to do except
to warn when something happens.
- The
second way to deal with the fire changing and becoming dangerous
is to design the engagement tactic from the knowledge of fire
behavior potential. When the potential reaches a danger threshold
the engagement is stopped and firefighter evacuation is accomplished.
This gets the troops out of the way in time but may look bad if
the fire doesn't make the run. Nevertheless, this is the only
way that some of the burnover accidents could have been avoided.
Logical
use of basic causative information (fire behavior information) enables
one to predict differences in fire intensity by matching observed
fire behavior and the alignment of forces to the alignment of forces
on the ground in the fire's path.
The
intensity observed in various alignments is predictably what will
reoccur when the fireground and fire are in similar alignments.
Forecast weather changes may or may not be significant and can be
included or rejected as useful information for prediction of changes.
Example:
Suddenly
a spotfire is detected. Take action or make predictions? Will
there be another spotfire? Which way is the condition going? Let
us say the spotfire came from a fire burning on an east aspect
and it spotted to a west aspect at 1600 hours. Compared to the
fire intensity on the east aspect, will the fire behavior be worse
or easier? Will there be more spotfires?
The
tactics should be determined from the answer. The tactics should
be defensive in this case. The tactical communication should include
the reasoning behind the opinion.
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A display
of fire behavior variation potential used for briefing fire overhead.
The
base map is the standard contour map that shows the fire perimeter.
If the map includes the fire spread history that is better yet.
Add the wind direction to the map to display the force and direction
of the wind. Add the hot aspect for the afternoon layer to the map
coloring the South, West and Flats with the Yellowommeter.
The
map now shows the alignment of forces for the afternoon, the most
dangerous period for extreme fire behavior. Identify the alignments
when past runs occurred. Identify where the fire edge will go into
alignment on the next work shift and draw an arrow where the forces
are aligned. This is a track for another potential fire run. This
will be the basis for setting the time tag tactic.
Describe
the potential and review the tactical deployment of the suppression
force to assure no one is in front of the potential run during the
time period forecast for the run.
You
may recall the video made of the Butte Fire burnover when 73 firefighters
were forced to deploy fire shelters. This entrapment was due to
a poorly devised tactical plan assuming burnout could widen a line
in timber by firing it out of alignment during the time the fire
would have the advantage of full alignment and that the safety areas
would be outside the fire's environment and be safe.
The
location of the fire perimeter must be known and accurately depicted
on the map. The aerial GPS system is the technology that assures
fireline locations are accurate.
This
CPS prediction map has been used on a number of large complex fires
and has had great acceptance by planning and line personnel.
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Fire
that is moving across the variations of topography will change speed
and direction as dictated by the combination of steepness of slope,
wind speed and direction, and fuel preheat/flammability. Predictions
of fire behavior changes can be made by observing the alignment
and strength of these forces in the fire's path. Where the forces
are more aligned, the fire intensity will increase. Where the forces
are less agreeably aligned, the fire intensity will decrease.
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An
electronic sensor which scans the difference in temperature between
solar heated fuel and shaded fuel.
This
tool is used to gather data in order to make fire behavior predictions.
When the fuel temperature is above 120 degrees f. sagebrush will
burn when the humidity is above 70% and air temperature is below
65 degrees f. How can that be? It was proven on the 1996 Sexton
II prescribed burn by Ventura County Fire Department.
Yogi
Berra put it this way, "They said it couldn't be done, but that
doesn't always work."
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Wonderful
to have but a poor command tool for firefighting. Differences in
intuitive based opinions between people are often not resolved.
The ranking officer's intuition directs the operation.
The
division Chief, the crew supervisor as well as some members of the
crew may disagree on tactics. Who is right? Is it important to act
on the opinion of who is right? Why are they right?
Ranking
officers are not privileged to superior knowledge, intelligence
nor experience in situations. The ranking officer may not act on
the opinion of a lower ranking officer even though the persons intuition
may be more correct for the situation. Many crew supervisors have
more experience than do the commanding officer in the situation
that may be facing them. Intuition is the direct perception of information
independent of any reasoning process, an untaught predictive skill.
Differences in intuitive opinions between people can not be resolved
except by the use of rank. Rank is responsible and accountable for
the decisions made. The ranking officer will not usually use a lower
ranked individual's opinion without giving up command.
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A phrase
which identifies the time period of peak fuel flammability on various
aspects. Where is the fuel on the flammability curve? Fuel flammability
is greater as it's temperature rises. Sunlit fuel temperature can
increase 80 degrees above shaded fuels. Each aspect has a peak heating
period as well as a time of warming and a time of cooling. As the
fuel on these aspects is warming, it is said to be going up the
flammability curve. As the fuel is getting less sun and cooling
with time, the fuel is going down the flammability curve. This phrase
facilitates communication of the reason for the situation getting
worse or easier.
Another
good rule to observe is not to have unburned fuel between you and
the fire during the peak hours of the aspect's flammability curve.
One exception is a north aspect. Many have paid the highest price
for ignoring that basic safety rule.
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A phrase
which tells of potential changes in the fire's intensity caused
by the fire entering a fuel bed with a higher or lower fuel temperature
than the one it is presently in. Fuel temperature is much more variable
than air temperature and it is the fuel's temperature that determines
its moisture content and flammability.
Even
though the air temperature and relative humidity are at a stable
point over the fuel bed, the fuel bed can be highly variable in
surface temperature and therefore highly variable in flammability.
Fuel
in daylight hours is constantly changing from cool to hot and back
to cool. You should know which way it is going. Describe the sunlit
fuel as hot fuel and describe the shaded fuel as cold fuel.
Sunlit
fuel is often heated to 180 degrees by solar radiation and becomes
many times more flammable than cool, shaded fuels. Fuel beds subject
to the solar heating variations are not a stable element. They are
a highly variable element in the fire triangle. Air temperature
and relative humidity readings do not reveal this variation of fuel
temperature. Air temperature and relative humidity are merely a
reaction to surface heating conditions and not a cause of variation
of fuel flammability.
When
a part of a fire is headed toward hot fuel, where it has greater
potential, explain; the fire is headed toward hot fuel, and make
the prediction, "it's going to get worse."
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Two
tactics used on wildland fires.
Opportunity
tactics are tactics based upon the opportunity to engage the fire.
Opportunity tactics are acceptable tactics when the fire behavior
is not a factor in the fireground situation. Whenever the fire is
changing, the tactics need to recognize and be based upon the fire
behavior in order to be safe and effective.
A drill
proficient fire officer can do opportunity tactics very well. Fire
behavior tactics are tactics determined from the observations made
of the fire behavior -- how to engage the fire is more dependent
upon prediction of when and where there are variations in the fire.
Only an experienced fire officer can implement fire behavior tactics.
The CPS is designed to teach this skill to shorten the learning
curve.
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Learn
how to make this key phrase prediction before determining the tactic
to employ.
Firefighting
safety depends on knowing and communicating this simple prediction
of the fire's potential. It is the middle portion of a complete
size-up statement.
"The
fire is going into alignment, it is getting worse, we need to adjust
the tactics to match the condition."
This
simple prediction puts you mentally ahead of the dangers of fire
intensity changes. Acting on this prediction is far safer than reacting
after the fire intensity changes.
The
most basic question to ask is, which way is the fire behavior going,
is it getting worse or easier with time? If this question isn't
answered, actions cannot be based on expected fire behavior, which
is one of the 10 standard orders.
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A phrase
which predicts the time period during which a tactic becomes potentially
dangerous and must be altered.
Using
CPS it is possible to predict when and where a fire behavior event
will be most likely to occur, when and where the fire will gain
full alignment of forces. This occurred on the Dillon Incident on
the 13th of August in 1994, refer to page 120. The indirect holding
and firing tactic was time tagged to halt at 1100 hours. The firefighters
were moved off the line before the fire made a high intensity run
from below. This becomes an example of how to do it right.
Had
this been done on many of the past fires, burnovers could have been
avoided. Examples are the Griffith Park fire which critically burned
100 firefighters and killed 33, the Mann Gulch fire of 1949 which
killed 14 firefighters, the Loop fire of 1966 which killed 13, the
Spanish Ranch fire that killed four firefighters in 1979, the 1994
South Canyon fire that took 14 lives, the 1994 fatality Glenn Allen
fire that burned over a small crew killing two, and the Calabasas
fire of 1996 which injured 10 firefighters.
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Identify
the fire's type to alert people of the necessity to select an appropriate
tactic.
There
are certain tactics that seem to work better on one type of fire.
Sometimes tactics become dangerous because the tactic was wrong
for the type of fire at the outset. Another twist in the situation
happens when a fire changes from one type to another in the middle
of your shift and the tactic suddenly does not match the situation.
Each
type fire has a matching tactic that is appropriate.
- Tactics
for wind driven fires are to anchor the heel and direct attack
the flanks, avoiding frontal attack except for use of defensible
space to protect structures.
- Tactics
for fuel driven fires too hot for direct attack are to go indirect,
burning out the area.
- Tactics
for topography fires must consider the variations on the fire
ground. These tactics must be based on reasoned prediction and
change before the fire changes.
Another
basic idea is to view time as an important factor on topography
fires because of the aspect's variation in solar heating. This variation
caused by time change is where the time tag came from.
Tactical
time tags should be considered when assigning crews to open line
on all topography fires.
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What
it did yesterday may repeat today. What does the fire history tell
you about the South Canyon fire on page 123? The fire burned for
three days moving downhill, out of alignment. What can we make of
that? It isn't going out by itself. The fire will continue to burn
while it is out of alignment even at night. What does that mean?
The fire will continue to travel until it gains a position to come
into alignment and then it will change its rate of spread and intensity
for the worse.
The
suppression effort failed to contain the fire while it is out of
alignment. What does that mean? It means that the fire is resistant
to present control efforts. None of what the fire told us is good
news and reason would presume a "getting worse" situation.
The
fire is moving while it is out of alignment and under-burning the
oak brush. The tops of the under-burned brush are now cooked and
dry much like frost killed Gamble Oak. The fuel is fire prepared
and ready to re-burn.
The
fire is located below the highly flammable canopy and is in alignment
to burn the crowns. The fire crept out of alignment from July 2nd
to July 6th backing down off a hilltop. When the fire made its first
run July 6th, 1994 it re-burned a strip of oak canopy that was in
full alignment. That run should have told us what the potential
of the fire was while it was in full alignment. We should have understood
the fire was in full alignment to burn overstory and was about to
cross the canyon and get in position of full alignment to run the
hot slopes to northeast. The fire behavior told enough about the
potential for change from a creeping fire into an inferno to serve
adequate warning for those with the observation skills to understand
what the fire was telling us. Only by perceiving the fire behavior
potential and altering the tactics before the fire went into alignment
could this tragedy have been avoided.
Learn
how to use what the fire is telling you to plan successful tactics.
Is it starting to spot, torch or make small runs? Which way is the
fire behavior going? Is it getting worse or easier? When the fire
moves or the sun moves, you need to know which way fire behavior
is going and adjust tactics to match the potential.
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A tool
that uses a shadow as an indicator much like a sundial, to indicate
the time period each aspect which is heating.
It
comes in two sizes, large, for teaching and use in the base camp
and a small pocket size model for use on the fireline.
With
this small tool you can amaze your friends with your predictive
capability on the fireline. When the shadow points to the compass
direction that aspect is at the peak of the flammability curve.
That is not the only way to identify hot aspects but it is a visual
aid.
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There
are four (4) types of fires that have different causes for the observed
fire signature. Wind driven, where the dominate force is wind;
fuels fires where the dominate cause of the behavior is the available
fuel; fire on fire where the fire and the radiation output becomes
the dominate force causing the behavior and the topography fire.
The alignment signature is derived from the fire intensity and rate
of spread due to the various alignments of wind, slope and solar
preheating, ³ fuel flammability level² for topography fires.
These signatures are used in predicting fire behavior in the path
of the fire. The logic is that the fire behavior will replicate
when the cause of the past behavior is understood, and the fire
is approaching the same alignment of wind, slope and pre-heat values.
The accuracy need only be the threshold of control level and
not rate-of-spread or flame length.
The predictions can be displayed on maps for strategy and tactical
uses.
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The
level of fire intensity and rate of spread that is about to go into
or beyond the firefighters capability to contain.
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A big
yellow highlighter used to delineate the variation in fuel flammability
on a contour map. The map is called a hot slope map and the area
of hot fuel by aspect and time is identified. Usually an afternoon
hot slope map is used to identify the topography that is facing
South, West and the flats, where there is higher solar preheating
during the afternoon.
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